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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                   FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
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      STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel,
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     W.A. DREW EDMONDSON, in his
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     capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL
     OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
     et al.
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               Plaintiffs,
     V.
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                                             No. 05-CV-329-GKF-SAJ
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     TYSON FOODS, INC., et al.,
               Defendants.
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                          TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
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                                JUNE 15, 2007
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                               MOTIONS HEARING
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     BEFORE THE HONORABLE GREGORY K. FRIZZELL, Judge
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     APPEARANCES:
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     For the Plaintiffs: Mr. Louis W. Bullock
                           Mr. M. David Riggs
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                           Mr. Richard T. Garren
                           Mr. Frederick C. Baker
22
                           Mr. W.A. Drew Edmondson
                           Ms. Kelly S. Burch
23
                           Mr. Robert A. Nance
                           Mr. J. Trevor Hammons
24
                           Ms. Ingrid Moll
     For the Defendants: Mr. Robert W. George
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                           Mr. Jay T. Jorgensen
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1 (APPEARANCES CONTINUED) Mr. Stephen L. Jantzen 2 For the Defendants: Mr. Michael R. Bond 3 Mr. John R. Elrod Mr. A. Scott McDaniel 4 Ms. Nicole M. Longwell Mr. Phillip D. Hixon 5 Ms. Theresa Noble Hill Mr. Robert P. Redemann 6 Mr. Robert E. Sanders Mr. Bruce Jones 7 Mr. Paul Thompson, Jr. 8 9 PROCEEDINGS 10 June 15, 2007 11 THE COURT: Be seated, please. 12 THE CLERK: Call case number 05-CV-329-GKF, Attorney 13 General for State of Oklahoma vs. Tyson Foods. Continued motion hearing. 14 15 THE COURT: What I would like to do on number 66 is 16 also wrap up the aspect that we had discussed at the earlier 17 hearing, specifically the argument that Tyson withdrew as to 18 Clean Water Act preemption. And have we discussed on both 19 sides, has everybody been given an opportunity to reply to 20 that? 21 MR. MCDANIEL: I would like to have an opportunity to respond to Mr. Baker's comments of yesterday, Your Honor. 22 23 THE COURT: All right, go ahead. 24 MR. MCDANIEL: Thank you. Good morning Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: Mr. McDaniel, good morning.

MR. BULLOCK: I was just making a scheduling accommodation, Judge.

THE COURT: It is a fascinating issue so maybe this is just a glimpse of argument to come. Go ahead.

MR. BAKER: May it please the Court, Fred Baker for the State. A couple of points. First of all, I've never heard of preemption being based upon allegations. Preemption derives from law and the law has to apply. So in order for <a href="New Mexico">New Mexico</a> to apply to our claims, and we don't disagree with how he characterizes them, but you have to have a facility, you have to have a hazardous substance and that's in dispute as well. So if, in fact, the Court, as the pleadings go forward, and we don't think the Court should, but if the Court were to determine that we haven't properly shown a facility, if we haven't properly shown a hazardous substance, because all CERCLA applies to is hazardous substances and the NRD, natural resource damages, that flow from the release of that hazardous substance.

a statute preempt something that it doesn't apply, how can just simply nonsensical, Your Honor. One last other comment on they're stripping New Mexico of all of its context. You can't look at a holding and just ignore the fact that New Mexico was 100 percent a CERCLA case. If you look at it, there were two types of releases in that site. There were petroleum releases

1 and there were hazardous substance releases. The petroleum releases, if I recall correctly, were handled under the 2 New Mexico statutory scheme. The hazardous substances which 3 4 triggered the Superfund site designation and so forth were handled through CERCLA. So we're dealing with a CERCLA site, 5 it was a hazardous substance. So of course CERCLA applies and 6 7 you can't wipe that away. 8 THE COURT: Don't you agree though that CERCLA can 9 apply absent EPA's involvement and designation as a Superfund 10 site? 11 MR. JORGENSEN: Oh, by all means. Yes, Your Honor, of 12 course. 13 THE COURT: And you'd agree that if the Court 14 ultimately determines one way or the other that CERCLA applies, 15 all of the ramifications, whatever those may be, of New Mexico 16 would then apply here as well. 17 MR. JORGENSEN: Conditioned on whatever those may be 18 because I think we all have different interpretations on what 19 those would be but, yes, I agree. 20 THE COURT: I wonder, Mr. Baker, if you know what the 21 status of New Mexico is? Is there a petition for 22 reconsideration or rehearing en banc, is there a petition for 23 cert, where is it? 24 MR. BAKER: My understanding is that it -- that case 25 has not progressed any further. There is no rehearing

imminent and substantial endangerment. And the ability to stop that conduct -- and in their papers they say, well, we deny it, we deny it anyway, that RCRA doesn't apply. And they deny that specifically that they have done anything wrong regardless.

But we also let them know, Your Honor, that, you know, we're seeking other causes of action but the way to -- and under Oklahoma law specifically you can't let it run off, it can't pollute or cause pollution. It can't create a nuisance. This is among other things. And that's where the behavior that needs to be stopped. It's very clear, stop polluting, stop causing poultry waste to run off into the environment, stop causing a public nuisance.

And I reiterate, Your Honor, that there's nothing in the statute or the provisions or the administrative regulations, because we're not talking about a violation section, which say that on this field Tyson Poultry grower X for which Tyson Poultry is legally responsible caused a release. It doesn't require us to do so.

Further, Your Honor, you know, they were also parties to the UG Spavinaw decision. They know what the conduct is. I want to make very clear, I mixed terms but I used it for illustrative purposes that, you know, RCRA doesn't require a facility that when we are talking about CERCLA, we said this isn't a facility. We're saying it's still the million acres where the conduct is occurring. I want to make that

distinction as well so as not to confuse those terms.

THE COURT: Here you're talking about generators, transporter, operators, owners.

MR. HAMMONS: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But we are talking about a facility. It says owners or operators of a treatment, storage or disposal facility.

MR. HAMMONS: Right.

THE COURT: So the term facility is used there.

MR. HAMMONS: The term facility is used but in my mind, you know, when I think of a CERCLA facility, it's somewhat different than the ones under RCRA.

THE COURT: You get to reply, surreply.

MR. JORGENSEN: I'll be very brief. So all of the cases under RCRA and all of the notice provisions of the federal environmental statutes say that a minimum notice has to tell you enough, enough specificity to suit the two purposes. That you can fix your conduct and avoid the lawsuit or the State can take action and thereby avoid a lawsuit. So that is -- we've been focusing here on is there a standard? That is the standard. It was not met here. Now, focusing on they know. They know is not the standard. Let me just say first they know is not the standard. You can't -- the burden is on the State to provide the notice, not just to say they know. But we don't know. I don't know today.

1 MR. BAKER: Right. 2 THE COURT: -- Oklahoma Statutes 2-6-105. 3 MR. BAKER: Right. We're not seeking to apply Count 8, Count 9 and half of Count 7, extraterritorially. 4 5 THE COURT: The half of Count 7 that you're talking about that you're not seeking to apply extraterritorially is 6 Title 2, Oklahoma Statute Section 2-18.1? 7 8 MR. BAKER: That's correct, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Okay. 10 MR. BAKER: With respect to the constitutional 11 arguments which I believe Mr. George started out with, so I'll take them in that order as well, is first of all the dormant 12 13 commerce clause argument. 14 I mean, you would agree we've been talking THE COURT: about this issue in chambers as a dormant commerce clause 15 issue; correct? 16 17 MR. BAKER: That's how we would characterize it as 18 well. 19 THE COURT: Would you agree, Mr. George? 20 MR. GEORGE: Yes, Your Honor. 21 MR. BAKER: And so we believe that the slide number 22 two, which it simply lays out the Pike test which we believe is 23 the applicable test because these statutes or these causes of 24 action are not particular to any extraterritorial conduct. They do, we believe, apply evenhandedly to effectuate 25